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I. THE MONTEJO DECISION
On September 6, 2002, Appellant Jesse Jay Montejo ("Montejo") was arrested for the
robbery and murder of Lewis Ferrari ("Ferrari").' After his arrest, Montejo waived his Miranda
2
rights, was questioned by police, and eventually admitted to murdering Ferrari. On September
10, 2002, Montejo was taken to court for a Louisiana state law mandated preliminary hearing.4
There, Montejo stood silent while the judge formally charged him with first-degree murder,
denied bond, and appointed counsel.5 Later on September 10th, 2002, police detectives went to
Montejo's cell and asked him if he would join them on a search for the murder weapon.6 Shortly
thereafter, Montejo was read his Miranda rights for a second time.7 After waiving his Miranda
rights, Montejo agreed to the search and joined detectives on the trip.8 During the excursion,
Montejo wrote a letter to the victim's widow, apologizing for what he had done to her husband.9
At the completion of the search, Montejo met his court-appointed counsel for the first time. 10
During Montejo's trial, his apology letter was admitted into evidence despite defense counsel's
objection." Consequently, the jury found Montejo guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced
him to death.12
1. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2082 (2009).
2. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2082.
3. The Louisiana statute reads, "[t]he sheriff or law enforcement office having custody of an arrested
person shall bring them promptly, and in any case within seventy-two hours from the time of the arrest, before a
judge for the purpose of appointment of counsel." LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 230.1(A) (West Supp. 2009).
4. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2082.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7 Id
8. Id.
9. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2082.
10. Id After meeting his counsel for the first time, Montejo's court-appointed attorney became livid
with law enforcement officials for questioning his client before he and his client had a chance to talk. Id.
11. Id
12. Id.
1
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On appeal, Montejo's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Louisiana Supreme
Court.' 3 Justice Victory, writing for the Louisiana Supreme Court, concluded that the Sixth
Amendment protection established in Michigan v. Jacksonl4 , which deemed any subsequent
waiver of a defendant's right to counsel invalid after he or she has already asserted or requested
their right to counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding, did not activate unless the
defendant actually requested an attorney or otherwise asserted his constitutional right to
counsel. 15 Here, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that Montejo simply stood
silent at his preliminary hearing and thus, never actually requested an attorney or asserted his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 16
Justice Victory also determined that Montejo's apology letter was properly admitted by
the trial court. 17 In resolving this issue, the court looked to a standard established in Montoya v.
Collins'8 , which required the defendant to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his
right to have counsel present during a police interrogation. 19 Ultimately, the Louisiana Supreme
Court determined that because Montejo had been read his Miranda rights and subsequently
waived them to the satisfaction of Montoya before his participation in the weapon search, the
apology letter was correctly admitted and his guilty verdict should stand.20
Montejo then appealed to the United States Supreme Court who granted certiorari on two
issues. 2 1 The first issue addressed was the extent and lasting use of the rule given by the Court in
Jackson just twenty-three years earlier, which does not permit law enforcement to commence the
questioning of a defendant once the defendant has asserted his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
at an arraignment or similar court proceeding.22 The second issue was whether Montejo should
be given the chance to challenge that the apology letter be suppressed under a rule created by the
Court in Edwards v. Arizona23, which stipulates that police must stop questioning the defendant
24
once he asserts his right to counsel being present during interrogation.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, began his analysis by describing the Louisiana
25Supreme Court's construal of Jackson. In effect, Justice Scalia stated that in order to activate
Jackson protection under the Louisiana court's construal, the criminal defendant must
affirmatively request counsel at the preliminary hearing.26 If an actual request occurs, any
subsequent waiver by the defendant of his or her Miranda right to counsel being present at police
questioning is treated as invalid.27 However, if the court appoints counsel and the defendant
does not actually request counsel, then Jackson is not activated and police are free to initiate
questioning of the defendant so long as he validly waives his Miranda right to having counsel
13. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2082.
14. 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1407-08 (1986).
15. State of Louisiana v. Montejo, 974 So.2d 1238, 1260-61 (5th Cir. 2008).
16. State of Louisiana v. Montejo, 974 So.2d at 1260-61.
17. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2082-83.
18. 955 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1992).
19. State ofLouisiana v. Montejo, 974 So.2d at 1261.
20. Id.
21. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2083.
22. Id.
23. 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85 (1981).
24. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2083.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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- - 28present during police questioning.
Justice Scalia also declared that the Louisiana Supreme Court's interpretation of Jackson
is problematic in states that automatically appoint counsel to the needy defendant with no
demand for counsel required.29 The majority explained that in such states, the defendant would
not be given the opportunity to trigger Jackson, as the court does not give the defendant a chance
to do so at a preliminary hearing or an arraignment.30 Consequently, Justice Scalia asserted that
this interpretation becomes arbitrary, as defendants in states that automatically appoint counsel
have no chance to activate Jackson, whereas defendants in states that require the defendant to
formally request counsel would, in a sense, activate Jackson by accident. 31
After deeming the Louisiana Supreme Court's construal of Jackson undesirable, the Court
refuted Montejo's argument for a different interpretation of Jackson.32 In essence, Montejo's
proposed interpretation suggested that once a defendant is represented by counsel, Jackson is
triggered and law enforcement may not commence any sort of questioning. 33 However, the
Court explained that Montejo's construal of Jackson would be completely inconsistent with the
true rationale of the Jackson decision.34
The majority then proceeded to recite the correct rationale of the decision in Jackson.35
Justice Scalia began the recitation by elaborating on the Court's opinion in Edwards.36 There, the
Court stated that the Edwards rule protects the defendant from being forced into waiving his
Miranda rights by police officers and detectives. 37 Further, the Court believed that Jackson went
a step beyond the Edwards rule by protecting the defendant from police badgering in regards to
his or her Sixth Amendment38 right to counsel.39
Further incorporated in the majority's discussion of the Jackson rationale are continual
references to Justice Stevens' Montejo dissent.40 Justice Scalia explained that the dissent
construed Jackson to protect a defendant's right to the assistance of counsel and not to prevent
police officer and detective badgering.41 Conversely, the majority disagreed and explained that
the anti-badgering justification is the only way to validate the Jackson opinion with the Court's
true Miranda waiver jurisprudence. 42
Justice Scalia also explained that when a defendant does not formally request counsel but
is nonetheless appointed such, it should not be presumed that any subsequent waiver of the right
28. Id. This may seem confusing at first look, however, if the Jackson protection has not been
activated, the defendant can be approached by police and questioning may take place so as the defendant has been
read his or her Miranda rights and a valid waiver of the right to having counsel present during police questioning
has been made to the satisfaction of the standard reiterated in Edwards. Edwards, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85.
29. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2084.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2085.
33. Id.
34. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2085.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2085-86.
37. Id. at 2086.
38. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in pertinent part, "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic]." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
39. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2086.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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to counsel is unwilling.43 Correspondingly, the majority advocated that Edwards and Jackson
stand for the idea that police should not badger defendants into wavering their Miranda rights, as
a defendant who does not ask for counsel has not necessarily decided if they would like to talk to
police or not.44 Ultimately, the Court explained that a presumption that a police interrogation
was coerced simply because the defendant had already been appointed counsel makes little
sense. 45
The opinion then proceeded to proclaim that, because Jackson has been proven
unworkable by the Court, grounds for overruling it existed.46 Moreover, the Court explained
that, under the standard set forth in Pearson v. Callahan47 , which stated that a decision may be
overruled after three factors are analyzed to the court's satisfaction, Jackson may be overruled.48
In support of the Court's determination, Justice Scalia asserted that Jackson was only twenty-
three years old and that its abolishment would not disturb any sort of reliance on the rule, as
defendants who are savvy enough to understand the protection of Jackson can clearly decide for
themselves if they would like to talk to law enforcement officials. 49 Also in support, the majority
advocated that the detriments of Jackson far outweigh its positives. 50 More specifically, the
Court believed that the Miranda - Edwards - Minnick1 line of cases were sufficient to protect an
indigent defendant's Fifth (against self-incrimination, guarantee of due process) 52 and Sixth
Amendment rights (assistance of counsel), while Jackson deterred police officers from
questioning defendants and created the possibility that guilty and dangerous suspects may be
released.
Finally, Justice Scalia believed that while the Louisiana Supreme Court correctly denied
Montejo's claim under Jackson, Montejo should still be able to argue that the apology letter be
suppressed under the Edwards rule.54 In essence, the Court believed that had Montejo exercised
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when police officers initiated questioning in regards to the
search for the murder weapon, a scenario existed in which Montejo could be potentially
successful in suppressing the apology letter under Edwards.5 However, the Court explained,
those determinations are for the Louisiana Supreme Court to make, as the United States Supreme
Court is a court of final review. 56
43. Id. at 2087.
44. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2087.
45. Id. at 2088.
46. Id.
47. 129 S.Ct. 808, 817-18 (2009).
48. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2088-89. The three factors elicited from Pearson are "the antiquity of the
precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of course whether the decision was well reasoned." Id. (citing
Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 816-17).
49. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2089.
50. Id.
51. Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S.Ct. 486, 493-94 (1990). Minnick explained that once a defendant
has invoked his right to counsel, the interrogation must stop and no subsequent interrogation may take place until
counsel is present, unless the defendant initiates contact regarding questioning with law enforcement. Minnick, 111
S.Ct. at 493-94.
52. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in pertinent part, "[n]o person ...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
53. Montejo, 126 S.Ct. at 2090-91.
54. Id. at 2091.
55. Id.
56. Id at 2092.
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Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kennedy joined. 7 In his
concurrence, Justice Alito explained that previously in the 2008-09 term, the Court overruled N.
Y v. Belton.58 There, the Court not only overruled Belton despite it having served as precedent
for twenty-eight years, but did so in spite of the fact that it had not been weakened by later
opinions, had been reaffirmed in more recent decisions, had demonstrated that it was completely
effective, and had caused considerable law enforcement dependence. 59 Moreover, Justice Alito
explained that the Court overruled Belton even though they had not been solicited to do so. 60
Finally, Justice Alito asserted that the dissent is now showing concern in light of the Court's
effort to overturn Jackson, yet a few months prior, in the overruling of Belton, the dissenters
made no such complaint. 6 1 Ultimately, Justice Alito concluded that the process of overturning
Belton fully reinforced the decision by the majority in this case. 62
Justice Stevens authored a dissenting opinion, which Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined
and Justice Breyer joined in part.63 Justice Stevens contended that the majority, through its own
agenda and without any verification that the Sixth Amendment protections recognized in Jackson
have brought about impairment to workings of the criminal justice system, discarded Jackson
because it made little sense from a theoretical and doctrinal standpoint. 64 The dissent then
asserted that the majority's supposition relied upon a misunderstanding of Jackson's true
rationale and an underestimation of the doctrine of stare decisis.65
Accordingly, the dissent reasoned, like the majority, that the Louisiana Supreme Court's
decision would prove to be an impracticable standard to follow in the future and would also be
arbitrary between defendants in different states.66 However, the dissent asserted that while both
choices are not ideal, neither one is caused by Jackson.6 7 In support of this premise, Justice
Stevens explained that if a defendant is entitled to Sixth Amendment protection when he has
requested an attorney, then the defendant is clearly entitled to the same protections when an
attorney has been secured.68 Moreover, Justice Stevens claimed that although the rules
implemented by Edwards and Jackson are similar, Jackson did not depend upon the reasoning of
Edwards, but rather it remained under the shelter provided to the attorney-client relationship by
the Sixth Amendment.69
Justice Stevens also addressed the majority's overruling of Jackson. In doing so, the
dissenters explained that although precedent is not absolutely set in stone, Justice Scalia
57. Id.
58. 101 S.Ct. 2860 (1981).
59. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2092 (Alito, J., concurring). The Court overruled Belton in Arizona v. Gant,
129 S.Ct. 1710, 1723 (2009). Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion. Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1713. Justice Scalia
wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 1724. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion and Justice Alito wrote a
dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy joined and Justice Breyer joined in part. Id.
at 1725-32.
60. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2092 (Alito, J., concurring).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2094 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2095.
67. Id.
68. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2095 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id at 2096.
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exaggerated his reasons for overruling Jackson.70 Similarly, Justice Stevens admonished Justice
Scalia's faulty balancing test to determine if the costs of Jackson outweighed its benefits. 7 1 In
effect, Justice Stevens asserted that Jackson not only benefitted law enforcement practices
immensely, but also proved to be more workable since the Court's decision.72 Finally, the
dissenters declared that Jackson played a large role in the protection of one's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel and that without this protection, a defendant may be deprived of his or her Sixth
Amendment right to have a lawyer present at all the important stages of a criminal prosecution.73
Also, Justice Breyer filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which he explained that while the
principles of stare decisis are not rigid, they do force the Court to follow the principle in this
case. 74
II. THE HISTORY BEHIND THE MONTEJO DECISION
The recognition of an individual's Sixth Amendment right to counsel originated in the
Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright.75 There, Justice Black, writing for the
majority, overruled the Court's ruling in Betts v. Brady.76 In doing so, the majority concluded
that any indigent individual brought into court as a defendant in a criminal proceeding is entitled
to the assistance of counsel. Moreover, the Court explained that the assistance of counsel is a
fundamental right which preserves life and liberty and that through the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment78 , this right applies to all of the states.79
Just one year after Wainwright, the Court examined the issue once again in Escobedo v.
Illinois.so In Escobedo, the Court addressed whether a denial by law enforcement officers to
grant a defendant's request for a lawyer during police questioning is a violation of the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 8 1 Justice Goldberg, writing for the majority, explained that an
individual who has been arrested and is being interrogated by the police, but has not been warned
of their right to remain silent and had their request for counsel denied, has ultimately incurred a
violation of their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.82 Furthermore, the majority explained
that any statement made by the defendant after a request for counsel may not be used in a
70. Id at 2097.
71. Id at 2098. The balancing test Justice Stevens discussed was the same test conducted by Justice
Scalia when formulating the majority opinion. Id at 2089. This test incorporated a weighing of Jackson's positives
versus its negatives. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2089.
72. Id. at 2098-99.
73. Id at 2100.
74. Id at 2101-02 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
75. 83 S.Ct. 792, 796 (1963).
76. Wainwright, 83 S.Ct. at 797. In Betts v. Brady, Justice Owen Roberts, writing for the Court,
explained that, " ... it is evident that the constitutional provisions to the effect that a defendant should be 'allowed'
counsel or should have a right 'to be heard by himself and his counsel', . . . at his election, were intended to do
away with the rules which denied representation, in whole or in part, by counsel in criminal prosecutions, but were
not aimed to compel the state to provide counsel for a defendant." 62 S.Ct. 1252, 1258 (1942).
77. Wainwright, 83 S.Ct. at 796.
78. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads in
pertinent part, "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
79. Wainwright, 83 S.Ct. at 795-97.
80. 84 S.Ct. 1758 (1964).
81. Escobedo, 84 S.Ct. at 1759.
82. Id. at 1765.
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criminal trial.83 In essence, the Escobedo Court concluded that when our adversarial system is
set in motion, the defendant's fundamental rights to life and liberty are activated and any request
for counsel made by the defendant must be granted. 84
While Wainwright recognized an individual's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and
Escobedo broadened this protection, the United States Supreme Court determined that the
protection of one's Sixth Amendment right to counsel may involve the Fifth Amendment as
85
well. In Miranda v. Arizona, defendant Miranda kidnapped and raped an eighteen year old
girl.86 During police questioning, Miranda confessed to forcing the victim in his car and raping
her.87 At trial, Miranda was found guilty on one count of kidnapping and one count of rape.88
On appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court, Miranda argued, inter alia, that his confession should
not have been admitted into evidence at trial because an attorney was not present when he made
the confession.89 However, the Arizona Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed his guilty verdict
on the basis that the confession had been correctly admitted under the standard set in Escobed 90
After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of
statements given to police during an interrogation by an individual who has been taken into
custody or has otherwise been deprived of his freedom of action in any way.91 The Court also
analyzed the necessity for protocol that will guarantee that the individual is afforded proper
protections under the Fifth Amendment from self-incrimination. 92 Chief Justice Warren, writing
for the majority, explained that the need for a uniform protocol that protects an individual's right
against self-incrimination is essential. 93 In doing so, the majority created a series of statements
that law enforcement must verbalize to an individual prior to interrogation. 94 The majority also
explained that the Sixth Amendment right to having counsel present at an interrogation is
essential to the protection provided by the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination, as the
two work together in fully advising the defendant of his right to remain silent.95 In effect, the
majority in Miranda determined that to fully protect an individual from self-incrimination, law
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1766.
85. Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).
86. State v. Miranda, 401 P.2d 721, 722 (Ariz. 1965).
87. State v. Miranda, 401 P.2d at 723.
88. Id. at 722.
89. Id. at 725-26.
90. Id. at 731-33.
91. Miranda, 86 S.Ct. at 1611-12.
92. Id. at 1612.
93. Id.
94. Id. As prescribed by the Court, the series of required statements must include that the "person ...
be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. The Court also explained
that "[t]he defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult
with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning." Id. Similarly, "if the individual is alone and
indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him." Id. Also, "[t]he
mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statement on his own does not deprive
him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter
consents to be questioned." Id.
95. Miranda, 86 S.Ct. at 1625.
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enforcement must unequivocally explain the rights of that individual to the individual before the
interrogation process begins. 9 6 Furthermore, any statement made by the individual to law
enforcement without having previously been advised of his or her Miranda rights, will be
deemed inadmissible at trial.97
After the Miranda majority incorporated one's Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination with one's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel in the form of a
Miranda warning, the United States Supreme Court focused solely on the waiver of one's Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel in Edwards v. Arizona.98 In Edwards, the
defendant was arrested and subsequently interrogated after being read his rights. 99 During the
interrogation, defendant Edwards gave a statement and later asked police if he could make a
deal.100 The police advised Edwards that no deal could be made and Edwards countered that he
wanted an attorney before making a deal. 101 Sometime the next day, two different detectives,
unaware of Edwards' request for counsel, approached him. 102 After being read his rights once
again, Edwards gave a statement to the two detectives regarding his involvement in a crime.'03
On appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court, Edwards argued that he had exercised his Miranda
rights, that he did not waive those rights, and that the statement he made was not done
intelligently and therefore, was involuntary.104 However, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's decision 05 and Edwards appealed to the United States Supreme Court.' 06
In Edwards, Justice White, writing for the majority, addressed whether the Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments require the suppression of a post-arrest statement that was given to
law enforcement after the suspect had requested counsel before further questioning. 107 The
majority explained that a waiver of one's right to counsel not only has to be voluntarily, but also
knowingly and intelligently.108 Moreover, a court's determination of this depends upon the facts
of each case, including the background and experience of the accused.109 Justice White further
elaborated that when an individual has invoked his right to counsel during police questioning, a
valid waiver of that right cannot be given simply by responding to further police initiated
questioning even if the police have re-read the individual his rights. 110 Furthermore, the majority
determined that once an individual invokes their Sixth Amendment right to counsel, he or she is
96. Id at 1637.
97. Miranda rights, as they are commonly known, are simply those rights which are specifically
elicited in the required series of statements to the individual by law enforcement before the interrogation process
may begin. Id. at 1611-12.
98. Similarly, a Miranda warning, as it has been commonly called, is a required warning of the rights
to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel to an individual by law enforcement before the interrogation process
may begin. Edwards, 101 S.Ct. at 1881.
99. State v. Edwards, 594 P.2d 72, 75 (Ariz. 1979).
100. State v. Edwards, 594 P.2d at 75.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 76.
105. State v. Edwards, 594 P.2d at 78.
106. Edwards, 101 S.Ct. at 1880.
107. Id. at 1881.
108. Edwards, 101 S.Ct. at 1884 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938)).
109. Id.
110. Edwards, 101 S.Ct. at 1885.
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not subject to more questioning by law enforcement until counsel has at least met with the
individual, unless that individual initiates further communication with law enforcement."
Just one year after Edwards, the Court addressed a similar issue in Michigan v.
Jackson."2 There, defendant Jackson was arrested on July 30, 1979 as a potential suspect for
murder. 113 On July 31, Jackson gave police three separate statements regarding the murder."14
On August 1, after failing a polygraph examination, Jackson gave yet another statement to
police; this time admitting to shooting the victim. Later that afternoon, Jackson was
arraigned. 116 At his arraignment, Jackson requested counsel be appointed for him.117 On August
2, after being read his Miranda rights, Jackson made another statement to police." 8 Prior to trial,
the trial court determined that all of the statements made by Jackson were admissible.'' 9
Consequently, Jackson was found guilty of second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit
second-degree murder. 120 On appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, Jackson argued, inter alia,
that his post-arraignment confession should not have been admitted, as counsel had been
appointed to him at his arraignment.121 The Michigan Supreme Court agreed, asserting that one's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is activated at the time of arraignment, when, in this case, the
defendant requested counsel at the arraignment. 122 The State of Michigan appealed and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.123
In Jackson, the Court addressed whether a defendant can legitimately waive his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel at a post-arraignment police questioning session that had been
commenced by law enforcement.124 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, affirmed the
Michigan Supreme Court's decision, agreeing that the post-arraignment statements should not
have been admitted. 12 5 In doing so, the majority refuted the State's numerous Fifth and Sixth
Amendment arguments.126 First, the State argued that the Edwards rule pertains to one's Fifth
Amendment right to counsel at police questioning and that its relevance to one's Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel was unclear. 127 Therefore, the State suggested, the
application of the Edwards rule in this case was inappropriate. 12 8 The Court, however, refuted
this argument by explaining that once the suspect becomes an adversary of the judicial process
(post-arraignment), he or she deserves at least as much protection as the Fifth Amendment
provides for the suspect under Edwards.129
111. Id.
112. Jackson, 106 S.Ct. at 1405-06.
113. People v. Bladel, 365 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Mich. 1984). The Jackson case and the Bladel case were
consolidated when it went before the Michigan Supreme Court, as the issues in each were identical. Id. at 58.
114. Id. at 60.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. People v. Bladel, 365 N.W.2d at 60-61.
118. Id. at 61.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. People v. Bladel, 365 N.W.2d at 70.
123. Jackson, 106 S.Ct. at 1407.
124. Id. at 1408.
125. Id. at 1411.
126. Id. at 1408-10.
127. Id. at 1408.
128. Jackson, 106 S.Ct. at 1408.
129. Id. at 1408-09.
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Second, the State argued that, factually, one's request for counsel during police
questioning is different the one's request for an attorney at an arraignment. 130 The difference
being that a defendant may not intend their request for counsel to include the assistance of
counsel during post-arraignment questioning.' 3 Justice Stevens refuted this argument as well,
asserting that when determining if a valid waiver has occurred, the Court must assume that a
defendant would request for the services of counsel at every stage where counsel may be
needed. 132
Third, the State claimed that Jackson had, in fact, made a suitable waiver by signing a
post-arraignment statement after being previously warned of his Miranda rights.133 However,
Justice Stevens refuted this argument by asserting that just as written waivers are invalid during
police-initiated Fifth Amendment (against self-incrimination) scenarios, written waivers are also
invalid under police-initiated Sixth Amendment (requesting for the assistance of counsel)
scenarios.134 Ultimately, the majority concluded that when a defendant requests for assistance of
counsel on a Sixth Amendment basis at an arraignment, any subsequent waiver of that right by
the defendant is invalid when law enforcement initiated the further questioning.135
Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in Jackson that was joined by Justices
Powell and O'Connor.136 There, Justice Rehnquist suggested that the Edwards rule makes little
sense in the context of the Sixth Amendment (in trying to request for an attorney).' 37 He
explained that the real purpose of the Edwards rule is to prevent law enforcement from
badgering a defendant into giving a confession of guilt.'38 Consequently, Justice Rehnquist
asked if that same protection is needed in Sixth Amendment scenarios, when the defendant
would be triggering his right to the assistance of counsel in a courtroom and not in front of
badgering law enforcement in a police station. 139 After rejecting this rationale, the dissenters
also asserted that the Edwards rule can be arbitrary, because under a Fifth Amendment setting, a
defendant is undoubtedly triggering his right to counsel; whereas, in a Sixth Amendment or
potential arraignment setting, some defendants are simply more fortunate that they invoked their
right to the assistance of counsel by accident. 140
After the Court extended the Edwards rule to protect an individual's right to the
assistance of counsel in Sixth Amendment settings, the Court examined another aspect of
Edwards in Minnick v. Mississippi. 141 There, defendant Minnick was arrested in connection to
two murders.142 The day after his arrest, two Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") agents
came to his jail cell to interview him. 143 Minnick refused to be interviewed, but was told that he
had no choice. 144 Minnick was then read his rights and refused to sign a waiver of those
130. Id. at 1409.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Jackson, 106 S.Ct. at 1409.
134. Jackson, 106 S.Ct. at 1410-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 1411.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1412.
138. Id. at 1412-13.
139. Jackson, 106 S.Ct. at 1413 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 1414.
141. Minnick, 111 S.Ct. at 488.
142. Minnick v. State, 551 So.2d 77, 81 (Miss. 1989).
143. Minnick, 111 S.Ct. at 488.
144. Id.
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rights.145 After giving the agents some information, Minnick explained that he would give them
even more information if they came back in a few days after he retained a lawyer. 14 6 Shortly
after the interview, Minnick met with his lawyer.147 Two days later, law enforcement returned
for questioning. 4 8 Once again, Minnick was told that he had no choice but to be questioned.149
The Deputy Sheriff read Minnick his rights and again he refused to sign a waiver of them.150
Minnick then proceeded to give the Deputy Sheriff a complete description of the crime. 15 At
trial, Minnick tried to suppress all of the statements he had given to law enforcement. 152 The
trial court suppressed the statements to the FBI agents but admitted the statements to the Deputy
Sheriff.153 Consequently, Minnick was convicted on two counts of capital murder and sentenced
to death.154 On appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court, Minnick argued that the statements
made to the Deputy Sherriff should have been suppressed under the Edwards rule as it applied in
a Fifth and Sixth Amendment setting.'5 5 However, the Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed and
affirmed his conviction.156 Minnick appealed his conviction to the United States Supreme Court
and they subsequently granted certiorari.157
In Minnick, the Court addressed whether an individual's Edwards protection ends once
the individual has consulted with his or her attorney. 58 Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, explained, without even reaching the Sixth Amendment issue, that one's Fifth
Amendment protection elicited in Edwards does not cease once the individual meets with an
attorney. 159 In effect, the Edwards rule bars any police-initiated interrogation once the individual
has made a request for counsel, unless the accused has counsel present at the time of police
questioning.160 Furthermore, Justice Kennedy asserted that the Edwards rule does not eliminate
the possibility that the suspect may still waive his right to counsel after he exercised that right, so
as the suspect initiates the discussions with law enforcement. 161 In support of these premises, the
majority cited the Miranda decision where the Court explained that the presence of counsel
during interrogation would be an ample protective mechanism to force the police interrogation
process to conform to Fifth Amendment requirements.' 62 Moreover, the presence of an attorney
will guarantee that the statements given by the suspect are not a product of law enforcement
coercion.16 3 Ultimately, Justice Kennedy concluded that when counsel is requested by the
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Minnick, 111 S.Ct. at 488.
149. Id.
150. Minnick v. State, 551 So.2d at 81.
151. Id.
152. Minnick, 111 S.Ct. at 489.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Minnick v. State, 551 So.2d at 83.
156. Id. at 83, 85.
157. Minnick, 111 S.Ct. at 489.
158. Id. at 488.
159. Id. at 489.
160. Id. at 491.
161. Id. at 492.
162. Minnick, 111 S.Ct. at 490 (citing Miranda, 86 S.Ct. at 1623).
163. Id. As previously stated, the Court in Minnick believed that the primary purpose of the Edwards
rule was to prevent law enforcement from trying to coerce the suspect into waiving his or her previously asserted
Miranda rights. Id. at 491. Therefore, the requirement of counsel being present during future police-initiated
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suspect, the police-interrogation process must end, and law enforcement may not re-
initiate questioning without the presence of counsel, whether or not the suspect has met with his
or her attorney for any length of time. 164
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE MONTEJO DECISION
There is no doubt that one's Fifth Amendment right free of self-incrimination is firmly
entwined with the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. These two rights fit
perfectly together in preserving an individual's rights when interacting with the State throughout
the adversarial process. Furthermore, the Court had created a four-level prophylaxis against
potential invasions of those particular rights.165 As Justice Scalia explained for the majority
in Montejo, the primary purpose of the Miranda - Edwards - Jackson - Minnick line of cases was
to prevent law enforcement from badgering a suspect into waiving his or her previously invoked
Miranda rights.'6 6 However, a more important purpose of this line of cases is the protection of
an individual's rights at every critical stage of the prosecution.167 Justice Stevens, in writing the
dissent in Montejo, expressed analogous ideas.' 6 8 For example, he contended that if a defendant
is allowed protection from law enforcement initiated questioning when he or she requests an
attorney, he or she is even more entitled to that same protection when he or she has obtained an
attorney.169 Moreover, once an attorney-client relationship is formed through the appointment of
counsel, the means by which that relationship was formed proves immaterial, as a legitimate
attorney-client relationship supplies a defendant with complete protection given by the Sixth
Amendment.' 70 While not controlling of the Court, the logic used by the dissenters strikes a
chord with the expectations of most Americans in regard to their constitutional rights. More
importantly, Justice Stevens and his fellow dissenters offered a premise that is consistent with
the continual protection of the constitutional claim 171 : the protection of an individual's rights at
every critical stage of the prosecution.
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia appropriately focuses on the lack of practicable workability
presented by the Court's decision in Jackson.1 72 There, he suggests Jackson proves unworkable
because some states require indigent defendants to verbally trigger his or her Sixth Amendment
interrogation after the suspect has invoked his or her Miranda rights seems to eliminate the possibility of police
coercion occurring. Id
164. Minnick, 111 S.Ct. at 491.
165. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2089-90.
166. Id. at 2085.
167. The Court elicited the "at all 'critical' stages of the prosecution" type of language in the famous
case of Powell v. Alabama, 53 S.Ct. 55, 57 (1932) and reapplied that language again in U.S. v. Wade, 87 S.Ct.
1926, 1932 (1967). Id.
168. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2094-2101 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 2095. The dissent also recognizes that this premise has been used by the majority before on
more than one occasion. Id. The Court used this premise in Patterson v. Illinois, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 2393 n. 3 (1988)
and again in Michigan v. Harvey, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 1181 (1990).
170. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2095 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. In Montejo, the majority stated that "doubts must be resolved in favor of protecting the
constitutional claim." 129 S.Ct. at 2086 (citing Jackson, 106 S.Ct. at 1409). This statement reaffirms the theory that
when in doubt, one's rights should be protected to the fullest and fairest extent possible. Id. The exact language of
Jackson is more revealing: "[d]oubts must be resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim. This settled
approach to questions of waiver requires us to give a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation to a defendant's
request for counsel . . . ." Jackson, 106 S.Ct. at 1409.
172. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2083-84.
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right to counsel, whereas, other states simply grant indigent defendants counsel without any sort
of verbal request by that defendant.1 73 Thus, some defendants are unjustly benefitting by having
their Sixth Amendment right automatically invoked by the court, when in fact they had no
intention to activate this right.174 While this premise does seem arbitrary1 75 and illogical, it does
not justify the complete dismissal of the rule set forth in Jackson. Instead of destroying the
Jackson rule completely, the Court could have, as they often do, preserved the rule to some
degree. In effect, the Court had the opportunity to preserve enough of the rule in order for
Congress to easily create legislation that would likely produce uniformity in regards to an
indigent defendant's appointment of counsel. Ultimately, had the Court provided such direction,
a more fair protection of one's Sixth Amendment rights might have been achieved. Instead, it
appears that the Montejo decision will likely cause movement by Congress and State legislatures
in the opposite direction; a far cry from giving American citizens the benefit of the doubt.
Consequently, as Justice Stevens explained in the Montejo dissent, one's fundamental Sixth
Amendment right to presence of counsel during all critical stages of the prosecution has been
dishonored. 176
Gregory Dapper
Id.
Id. at 2084.
Id.
Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2095-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173.
174.
175.
176.
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